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Behavior of power plants in collusion and competitive markets considering 
external costs 
 
Abstract: In this paper, a mathematical model is proposed to optimize the production level of Power Plants 
(PPs) in collusion and competitive markets and in the presence of external costs. To evaluate the model, 
two meta-heuristics, such as Genetic Algorithm (GA), and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), are 
proposed. A numerical example is studied to assess the behavior of PPs in the presence of external costs. 
According to the computational results, the increment in the external costs will decrease the production 
level and profit of all PPs in both collusion and competitive markets. But the computational results show 
that the effect of increment in the external costs on the PPs with high-quality equipment is less compared 
to the PPs with poor equipment. Moreover, the increment in the external costs will force PPs to use greener 
fuel resources instead of fossil fuel.  
Keywords: Power Plant; Environmental Pollutant; External Cost; Collusion Market; Competitive Market; 
Genetic Algorithm; Particle Swarm Optimization. 
 
1. Introduction 
In today’s world, power industry plays a fundamental role in daily life of people and provides necessary 
facilities for development of countries. Since Michael Faraday introduced the underlying principles of 
electricity generation in the 1820s, PPs use the same principles so far, i.e., generating electricity by 
converting other resources.  
Because PPs use fossil fuel as their main resources to generate electricity, they would probably 
emit a significant amount of environmental pollutant. Due to increasing consciousness of people in all 
around the world, governments are enacting some regulations and providing incentive plans for PPs to 
protect the environment. Thus, decision-makers in this industry have been motivated to control and decrease 
the environmental contaminants emitted by PPs. The process of converting primary resources to electricity 
emits hazardous pollutants, such as 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶3, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥. Emission of such environmental 
contaminants imposes noticeable harms to the environment. Therefore, this problem has drawn the attention 
of researchers in recent years (Vrhovcak et al., 2005). In contrast to the most of developed countries, the 
majority of under-developed countries have not paid attention to hazardous effects of environmental 
pollutants emitted by PPs into the environment. In such a situation, the concurrent price of electricity in 
markets is nominal and does not include the external costs that are imposed on the environment (Weinzettel 
et al., 2012). Adding these external costs to the nominal price of electricity would be a necessary and 
effective step toward motivating PPs to take responsibility for the environmental pollutants. In addition, 
considering external costs could provide the conditions required for supplying sustainable and greener 
energies (Khoshakhlagh et al., 2013). 
 In the power industry, competition between PPs might be risky due to high-level of investment 
(Jaehnert and Doorman, 2012). Considering the fact that there are only a few number of PPs in the majority 
of under-developed countries, and moreover, homogenous nature of electricity, electricity market can be 
called as collusion or competitive markets. In such markets, PPs can pursue various policies, e.g., decrease 
their production level, in order to increase the price of electricity (Stoft, 2002). Thus, cooperation mode 
with other companies is fundamental in such markets. In addition, it is worth mentioning that this decision 
affects market share and profit acquired by companies. Hence, the behavior of PPs in collusion and 
competitive markets has been investigated and compared in this paper. For this purpose, a non-linear 
optimization model for PPs, which considers abovementioned external costs, has been proposed in this 
study. The proposed mathematical model aims to determine the production level of PPs in the presence of 
external costs. To the best of our knowledge, merely few studies have considered external costs for PPs. 
 In this study, two meta-heuristic algorithms, such as GA and PSO, have been proposed to solve 
large-scale instances of the problem. Then, the performance of these two algorithms have been compared 
with each other to determine which of them are more efficient in terms of solution quality and CPU Time. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; following the literature review in Section 2, 
mathematical models for collusion and competitive markets are proposed in Section 3. The meta-heuristic 
algorithms are developed in Section 4. Then, a numerical example is studied in Section 5. Eventually, 
Section 6 presents the conclusion.   
2. Literature review 
As previously mentioned, colluding or competing with each other is a critical decision for PPs. Carried our 
investigation by Sweeting (2007) showed that Britain PPs has colluded with each other between 1992 and 
2000. Fabra and Toro (2005) also showed that PPs in the decentralized market of Spain had colluded with 
each other in 1998. In such a market, PPs have to consider the mutual interests of each other and cooperate 
with each other. Therefore, they try to maximize their shared profits with respect to the market's demand. 
This kind of cooperation, in which consumers confronts only with one electricity generator, is called Cartel. 
Jehle (2001) proposed a mathematical model for collusion market which maximizes all profit functions of 
PPs.  
Unlike the cooperation mode of PPs in collusion market, PPs pursue conflicting goals in the 
competitive market. Consequently, each PP considers others as a competitor. Given that source of profit is 
limited in this condition, Nash equilibrium has been used in most of the previous studies in order to find 
the optimal policy for PPs. In the case of agreeing on one of the possible solutions, PPs gain more profit in 
comparison to not agreeing on any solution. There are many investigations in the literature relevant to the 
competitive market for PPs, such as Wen and David (2001), Hobbs (2001), Li and Shahidehpour (2005), 
Lise et al. (2006), Yucekaya et al. (2009), Li et al. (2011), Fan et al. (2012), Shafie-Khah et al. (2013), 
Ladjici et al. (2014). 
Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply function equilibrium are relevant models to collusion and 
competitive markets. According to Willems et al. (2009), researchers mostly have used Cournot and Supply 
function equilibrium in order to determine the price of each unit of electricity. Cournot model considers 
power market as an energy pool which PPs maximizes their profit by increasing or decreasing the 
production level of themselves. Based on the supply of PPs, the price of electricity is determined in the 
Cournot model. In the other word, PPs determine the price of electricity by determining their production 
level. Some studies, such as Hobbs (2001), Willems (2002), Ellersdorfer (2005), and Bushnell et al. (2007), 
have used Cournot model in order to determine the price of electricity. On the other hand, PPs maximize 
their profit based on supply curve (dependent on the price) in the Supply function equilibrium. Unlike the 
Cournot model, the supply of each PP does not depend on the supply of other PPs in the Supply function 
equilibrium. Moitre (2002), Evans and Green (2005), Li and Shahidehpour (2005), Holmberg (2008), and 
Shafie-Khah et al. (2013). 
As noted, generating electricity imposes hazardous external costs to the environment, human 
health, and climate. Respecting to environment (i.e., damage to agriculture products, industrial goods, and 
species of animals), human health, and climate (i.e., global warming, heat waves, storms, and rising sea 
levels), Streimikiene and Alisauskaite-Seskiene (2014) evaluated the emission costs of environmental 
contaminant, i.e.,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥, for PPs in Lithuania. Table (1) shows the determined external costs 
by Streimikiene and Alisauskaite-Seskiene (2014). 
Table 1. External costs of pollutant emission based on Streimikiene and Alisauskaite-Seskiene (2014) - 
(USD/gr) 
Pollutant 
Environment Health Climate Total Cost 
Damage to 
biodiversity 
Damage to 
product 
Damage to 
materials 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥  0.985 × 10−3 0.357 × 10−3 0.077 × 10−3 6.098 × 10−3 - 7.517 × 10−3 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 0.193 × 10−3 −0.029 × 10−3 0.283 × 10−3 6.621 × 10−3 - 7.068 × 10−3 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 - - - - 0.023 × 10−3 0.023 × 10−3 
 Considering the high importance of environment, human health, and climate, there are also more 
investigations in the literature which studied the external costs of pollutants’ emission, such as Roth and 
Ambs (2004), Vrhovcak et al. (2005), Weinzettel et al. (2012), and Georgakellos (2012). 
Regarding the abovementioned studies, it can be claimed that there merely few studies that have 
considered external costs of pollutant emission; furthermore, to best of our knowledge, there are fewer 
studies that have compared the behavior of PPs in collusion and competitive markets. 
3. The proposed mathematical model 
In this study, we have proposed two mathematical formulations for PPs in both collusion and competitive 
markets. These mathematical formulations aim to determine the production level of PPs in order to 
maximize their profit. Besides, these models minimize establishing and maintenance costs of PPs, 
purchasing fuel resources, and external costs of pollutant emission. 
 First of all, we have introduced the main principles used for a PP in the following. Then, we have 
adapted them to multiple PPs. To do this, we have introduced indices, parameters, and decision variables 
as follows: 
- Indices: 
𝑗𝑗 Type of fuel resources  𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝐽𝐽} 
𝑘𝑘 Type of environmental contaminants 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝐾𝐾} 
- Parameters: 
𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾 Efficiency coefficients of a PP 
𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 Reverse of heating value for jth type of fuel resources 
𝜇𝜇 Waste coefficient of a PP 
𝛿𝛿′,𝛿𝛿 Coefficients of Cournot model 
𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 Price of jth type of fuel resources 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚 Costs of establishing, generating, and maintenance per each unit of electricity generated in a 
PP 
𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 Amount of kth type contaminant emitted per each unit of jth type of fuel resources 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 External cost of kth type of contaminant 
𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) Maximum capacity of a PP throughout a year 
𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 Available amount of jth type of fuel resources throughout a year 
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 Permissible threshold for emission of kth type of contaminant 
𝑠𝑠 Coefficient of paid subsidies to a PP 
- Decision variables: 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 Amount of electricity generated in a PP using  jth type of fuel 
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 Energy required for a PP in order to generate electricity using  jth type of fuel resources 
𝜌𝜌 Price of electricity unit 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 Subside acquired by a PP from government 
In the current investigation, the energy required for PPs to generate electricity by jth type fuel 
resources has been calculated based on the quadratic function proposed by El-Hawary (1995): 
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾          (1) 
 To implement the external costs, the Cournot model has been applied to determine the real price of 
generating each unit of electricity. In this model, the price of each unit of electricity depends on the pure 
amount of electricity generated by all PPs, i.e., total amount of electricity generated minus waste. Note that 
the waste of each PP has also been calculated based on the quadratic function proposed by Grainger and 
Stevenson (1994). The following equation calculates the price of each unit of electricity generated by a PP 
based on the Cournot model: 
𝜌𝜌 =  𝛿𝛿 − 𝛿𝛿′�∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �        (2) 
 It has been assumed that a PP acquire subsides from governments based on the following linear 
equation: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ �∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �        (3)  
 Thus, the proposed mathematical model for a PP can be written as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 = �∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 � �𝛿𝛿 − 𝛿𝛿′�∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �� + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ �∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 � −                          ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 −𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1  (4) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡: 
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(max)          (5) 
𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾) ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗   ∀ 𝑗𝑗      (6) 
∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝑘𝑘      (7) 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0       ∀ 𝑗𝑗      (8) 
 The objective function consists of five terms; first and second terms maximize the income and 
subsides earned by a PP, respectively. The third, fourth, and fifth terms also minimize the costs of 
purchasing fuel resources required for generation of electricity, pollutants emission, and building, 
generating and maintenance of a PP, respectively. In order to calculate the average cost of establishing, 
generating and maintenance of a PP for a specific amount of electricity, total costs of building, generating 
and maintenance of a PP has to be determined for its whole lifetime considering interest rate. Afterward, 
prorate this cost to its maximum capacity, i.e., 𝑝𝑝(max). 
 Constraint (5) ensures that a PP cannot generate electricity more than its capacity. Constraint (6) 
guarantees that a PP cannot use more fuel resource of jth type than the predetermined threshold by the 
government, i.e., 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗. Constraint (7) ensures that a PP cannot also emit environmental pollutant more than 
the predetermined threshold by the government, i.e., 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗. Eventually, Constraint (8) indicates the positive 
decision variables. 
 In the following two sub-sections, this model will be adapted for multiple PPs in collusion and 
competitive markets, respectively. 
3.1. Adapted model for power plants in collusion market 
Considering the homogenous nature of electricity, and a few number of PPs, electricity market can be called 
as collusion or competitive markets. In this sub-section, we intend to adapt the simple mathematical model 
proposed earlier for multiple PPs in the collusion market. Note that we have used 𝑖𝑖 as the index of PPs. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (∑ 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ) = ∑ (∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ) �𝛿𝛿 − 𝛿𝛿′�∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ��𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 +                         ∑ 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ (∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 )𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 −                          ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚.∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1   (9) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡: 
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(max)    ∀ 𝑖𝑖      (10) 
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝑗𝑗      (11) 
∑ ∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ∀ 𝑘𝑘      (12) 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗      (13) 
It should be noted that Eq. (9) is the collusion or Cartel model for PPs, which tries to maximize 
the profit earned by all PPs in the collusion market.  
3.2. Adapted model for power plants in competitive market 
In the case of the competitive market, interests of PPs conflict with each other, and they generate electricity 
separately. In such a circumstances, agreeing on one of the possible cases would be more beneficial for all 
sides rather than not agreeing upon a case. Therefore, we have used the Nash equilibrium in order to find 
the best policy for PPs. Using the Nash equilibrium, the proposed model has been adapted for the 
competitive market, and reformulated as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹1 × … × 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼) = [(∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇1 ∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ) �𝛿𝛿 − 𝛿𝛿′�∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇1 ∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �� +                                                   𝑠𝑠 ⋅ �∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇1 ∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 � − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼1𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾1�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 −                                                     ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼1𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾1�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 −𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚 ∑ 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ] × … ×                                                   [(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ) �𝛿𝛿 − 𝛿𝛿′�∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �� +                                                   𝑠𝑠 ⋅ �∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 � − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 −                                                   ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 −𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ] (14) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡: 
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(max)    ∀ 𝑖𝑖      (15) 
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝑗𝑗      (14) 
∑ ∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ∀ 𝑘𝑘      (16) 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗      (17) 
4. The proposed GA and PSO 
The exact methods cannot efficiently solve NP-hard problems (mostly large-scale instances) with 
respect to CPU Time. Furthermore, the proposed mathematical model is non-linear, and there would be 
no guarantee for the exact methods to solve it to optimality. Therefore, we have developed two meta-
heuristic algorithms, i.e., GA and PSO, to resolve these problems. 
4.1. Solution representation 
One of the most important parts in designing efficient meta-heuristic algorithm is solution representation 
(the way that solutions are coded). In this study, each solution is represented by I sections (number of PPs), 
which each consists of J subsections ( the type of fuel resources). Random numbers between zero and one 
are generated and assigned to each of these sub-sections. Then, amount of electricity generated by each 
type of fuel resources is calculated based on Eq. (18). 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = ( 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖 ) × 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)   ∀ 𝑖𝑖      (18) 
In order to clarify the abovementioned structure, Fig. (1) is provided below for a problem with three 
PPs and three types of fuel resources. It should be noted that the presented solution representation has been 
used in both of the proposed meta-heuristic algorithms. 
>>Please insert Fig. (1) about here>> 
4.2.The proposed GA 
GA is a recognized population-based meta-heuristic algorithm for computational models inspired by 
evolution. This algorithm encodes possible solutions of problems on simple structures called chromosome, 
and apply various operators to these structures in order to create high-quality solutions (Whitley, 1994).  
4.2.1. Initial population and parents selection 
As stated, GA is a population-based meta-heuristic algorithm and require an initial population. For this 
purpose, we have generated initial population for this algorithm randomly. All chromosomes generated in 
the first generation are considered as parents, but it is different for the rest of generations. Selecting the 
parents of the second and subsequent generations is done through tournament method in order to maintain 
the diversity of the population. 
4.2.2. Fitness function 
After generating the initial population or generating new population in the next iterations, the fitness of 
each chromosome will be evaluated based on Eqs. (9) and (14) for the collusion or competitive markets, 
respectively. Note that we have applied the penalty function method in this study to control the infeasible 
solutions. Further clarification has been provided in sub-section 4.4. 
4.2.3. Crossover and mutation operators 
Crossover and mutation are two important operators in GA. As the most important operator in GA, the main 
intention of crossover operator is to improve the quality of solutions. Besides, the mutation operator aims 
to increase the diversity of the population. In this study, two-point crossover and swap mutation have been 
applied in the proposed GA. Fig. (2) shows two illustrative examples of the crossover and mutation 
operators.  
 These operators are applied iteratively to enhance the quality of solutions in the population. This 
procedure lasts until the termination criterion is met. In this paper, we have defined the termination criterion 
based on the maximum number of iteration. 
>>Please insert Fig. (2) about here>> 
4.3.The proposed PSO 
PSO is also a population-based meta-heuristic algorithm, which was introduced by Kennedy and Eberhart 
(1995). This algorithm is well-known for its sound performance in dealing with optimization problems. We 
have developed this algorithm besides GA to validate the performance of both algorithms. Furthermore, we 
were motivated to figure out which of these algorithms could outperform the other one. 
 We have originated the settings used in the proposed PSO from Clerc and Kennedy (2002). To sake 
for brevity, therefore, we refer interested readers to Clerc and Kennedy (2002) for more details. 
4.4. Penalty function 
Given that the proposed meta-heuristic algorithms generate the initial population and apply operators 
randomly, it is possible that some solutions would be infeasible, i.e., solutions cannot satisfy the constraints 
of the problem. For this purpose, we have introduced two penalty functions to calculate the violations of 
solutions. 
𝑉𝑉1 = ((𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘−𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘+1)+
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘−𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘+1
× 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘
𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘−1
) × 105  ∀ 𝑘𝑘      (19) 
𝑉𝑉2 = ((𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗−𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗+1)+
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗−𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗+1
× 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗−1
) × 105  ∀ 𝑗𝑗      (20) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 and 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 refer to the emission of kth type of pollutants, and consumption of jth type of fuel 
resources, respectively. Accordingly, Eqs. (19) and (20) calculate penalty costs for emission of 
environmental contaminants and consumption of fuel resources, respectively. These values are multiplied 
by an adequately large coefficient, then, added to the main objective functions, i.e., Eqs. (9) and (14). 
5. Numerical example 
In this section, a numerical example has been studied. Authors have investigated the power industry in Iran 
and has created the numerical example contemporary condition in this country. This numerical example 
consists of three different PPs. Given that PPs of Iran mostly use fuel-oil, gas-oil, and gas as their primary 
fuel resources, therefore, PPs would mainly emit 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 as three hazardous environmental 
contaminants. Thus, external costs of three mentioned contaminants have been considered in this study. 
 According to Six-Bus system, we have extracted the efficiency coefficients for all PPs. Afterward, 
we have specified the maximum capacity of PPs based on their efficiency coefficients. Table (2) shows 
efficiency coefficients and maximum capacity of PPs. 
Table 2. Efficiency coefficients and maximum capacity of PPs  
PP 
𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾 Maximum capacity (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(max)) 
1 0.00041 15.5 1078 2.75×106 (MWh) 
2 0.00031 16 14 2.75×106 (MWh) 
3 0.00051 14 702.9 2.75×106 (MWh) 
 As previously mentioned, PPs mostly use fuel-oil, gas-oil, and gas as their primary fuel resources 
in Iran. Based on the balance sheet of Iran's energy in 2011, the price of these fuel resources has been 
determined. Moreover, reverse of the heating value for fuel resources has been extracted from the detailed 
stats of Iran's electricity industry in 2011. Table (3) displays the price and reverse of the heating value for 
fuel resources. 
Table 3. Price and reverse of the heating value for different types of fuel resources 
Fuel Fuel-oil (j=1) Gas-oil (j=2) Gas (j=3) 
Price (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗) 0.057 (USD/lit) 0.1 (USD/lit) 0.022 (USD/m
3) 
Reverse of heating 
value (𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗) 
0.108 (lit/Mcal) 0.116 (lit/Mcal) 0.114 (m3/Mcal) 
With respect to the heating value, pollution level of fuel resources has also been determined and 
provided in Table (4). 
 
 
Table 4. Pollution level of fuel resources 
                     Pollution level 
Fuel resources 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥  (𝑘𝑘 = 1) 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 (𝑘𝑘 = 2) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 (𝑘𝑘 = 3) 
Fuel-oil (𝜗𝜗1𝑗𝑗) 5 (gr/lit) 46.9 (gr/lit) 2978 (gr/lit) 
Gas-oil (𝜗𝜗2𝑗𝑗) 5.2 (gr/lit) 15.7 (gr/lit) 2648 (gr/lit) 
Gas (𝜗𝜗3𝑗𝑗) 3.1 (gr/m3) 0 (gr/m3) 2133 (gr/m3) 
 In order to calculate the average cost of establishing, generating and maintenance of a PP for a 
specific amount of electricity, total costs of building, generating and maintenance of a PP has to be 
determined for its whole lifetime considering interest rate. Afterward, prorate this cost to its maximum 
capacity. We have originated this cost from other studies in the literature. According to Lajevardi and 
Mohades (2010), we have set 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓&𝑜𝑜&𝑚𝑚 equal to 7.1×10-3 USD per generating each unit of electricity. It is 
worth mentioning that each unit of electricity in this study is set equal to Kilowatt hour (KWh).  
 𝛿𝛿 is a constant coefficient in the Cournot model that always considered to be larger than the cost of 
generating each unit of electricity. According to the balance sheet of Iran's energy in 2011, cost of 
generating each unit of electricity has been estimated to be equal to 0.035 USD in Iran; therefore, 𝛿𝛿 has 
been set to be equal to 0.039 USD. 𝛿𝛿′ also is one another constant coefficient in the Cournot model. While 
Chen et al. (2006) and Cunningham et al. (2002) considered this coefficient equal to 10−2, we also have 
set 𝛿𝛿′ equal to 10−2 in this study. 
 Considering the fact that a portion of electricity generated by PPs might be wasted, entire electricity 
generated by PPs would not be transferred to the market. Amount of waste directly depends on the distance 
of PPs from the demand markets. Furthermore, the waste coefficients of electricity generated by PPs could 
vary from each other. To sake for simplicity, we have set the waste coefficient of all three PPs equal to 10−8. 
 In the literature, many investigations have evaluated the costs of environmental contaminants. Roth 
and Ambs (2004) studied destructive effects of environmental pollutants, such as 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥, and 
estimated three cost ranges for their emission, i.e., lower range, best estimate range, upper range. As they 
stated, the external costs for emission of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 can utmost be equal to 7.1 × 10−3, 3.5 × 10−3, 
and 0.028 × 10−3 USD per gram, respectively. To assess how gradually implementation of the external 
costs by the government would affect the market, six different scenarios have been introduced with respect 
to the upper range of external costs mentioned earlier. These scenarios have been provided in Table (5). 
Moreover, available fuel resources for generating electricity, and permissible amount for emission of 
pollutants are introduced in Tables (6) and (7), respectively. 
Table 5. Six scenarios of implementing the external costs by the government - (USD/gr) 
            Scenarios 
 
External costs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1 0 1.4 × 10−3 2.8 × 10−3 4.3 × 10−3 6.7 × 10−3 7.1 × 10−3 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2 0 0.7 × 10−3 1.4 × 10−3 2.1 × 10−3 2.8 × 10−3 3.5 × 10−3 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 0 0.005 × 10−3 0.011 × 10−3 0.017 × 10−3 0.023 × 10−3 0.028 × 10−3 
 
 
Table 6. Available fuel resources for each of PPs 
 𝜎𝜎1 (Million -lit) 𝜎𝜎2 (Million -lit) 𝜎𝜎3 (Million -m3) 
Available source of fuel for each 
PP per a year 100 100 100 
Table 7. Permissible amount for emission of pollutants - (m3×103) 
 𝑍𝑍1 𝑍𝑍2 𝑍𝑍3 
Permitted amount of pollutant emission 1,240 6,000 800,000 
After introducing all parameters required creating a numerical example, then, we have studied this 
numerical example in the following using two meta-heuristic algorithms. 
5.1. Computational results 
To evaluate the numerical example, both algorithms have been coded in MATLAB 2016. Moreover, this 
numerical example has been solved in a laptop with Core i5 CPU and 8 GB of RAM. Before solving the 
problem, we have tuned the parameters of GA. To do this, we have applied the Response Surface 
Methodology (RSM) method using Minitab 17. For this purpose, four factors, i.e., parameters, such as the 
number of initial population, number of iteration, crossover rate, and mutation rate have been evaluated. 
Three levels have been assumed for each of these factors; these levels have been provided in Table (8). 
Note that we have originated PSO algorithm form Clerc and Kennedy (2002), and adapted it for this 
problem. For this reason, we use the parameter setting suggested by Clerc and Kennedy (2002) in the rest 
of this paper.   
Table 8. Range of parameters settings for the proposed GA 
                                 Levels 
Parameters 
1 2 3 
Crossover rate 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Mutation rate 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Number of iteration 800 1000 1200 
Number of initial population 200 300 400 
To tune the parameters of GA, we have studied one-way and two-way interactions. Fig. (3) shows 
the importance of these interactions with 90% of confidence level. Considering P-Values, 𝐴𝐴, 𝐶𝐶, 𝐵𝐵 × 𝐵𝐵, and 
𝐶𝐶 × 𝐷𝐷 are identified as the important interactions. Thus, Eq. (21) may effectively tune and determine the 
best settings of factors. 
>>Please insert Fig. (3) about here>> 
𝑦𝑦 = 739533 − 6767𝐴𝐴 + 2094𝐶𝐶 + 4160𝐵𝐵 × 𝐵𝐵 + 2809𝐶𝐶 × 𝐷𝐷     (21) 
After optimizing Eq. (21), the best possible setting for the factors discussed earlier has been 
provided in Table (9). Based on Clerc and Kennedy (2002), we have also provided the optimal settings for 
PSO algorithm in this table. 
 
 
Table 9. Parameter settings considered for the proposed algorithms 
The proposed GA The proposed PSO 
Initial population 400 Initial population 400 
Max iteration 1000 Max iteration 1000 
Crossover rate 0.7 𝜑𝜑1 and 𝜑𝜑2 2.05 
Mutation rate 0.2 Personal learning coefficient 𝐶𝐶1 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝜑𝜑1 
Parent selection Tournament Global learning coefficient 𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝜑𝜑2 
After tuning the parameters of algorithms, each of 12 instances created in the numerical example, 
i.e., six instances for the scenarios of the external costs in the collusion market and six instances for the 
scenarios of the external costs in the competitive market, has been solved for 15 times using the proposed 
algorithms. Then, we have applied the 2 –  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡 test with 90% of confidence level in order to figure 
out which of these algorithms preforms better. To do so, we have determined the total production of PPs 
and created a sample consisting 15 data (due to solving each instance 15 times with each of algorithms) for 
each instance. Then, we have compared the data of a sample obtained by GA with its corresponding sample 
obtained by PSO algorithm. The results of 2 –  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡 test indicates that both algorithms perform 
identically for more than 90% of instances. In the rest of instances, PSO algorithm mostly outperforms GA. 
To sake for brevity, we have only illustrated the results obtained of the comparison between the proposed 
GA and PSO for the first scenario of external costs and in the collusion market. As illustrated in Fig. (4), 
there is no significant difference between the obtained results by the proposed GA and PSO. However, the 
standard deviation for the solutions provided by PSO algorithm is much smaller than the ones provided by 
GA. In other words, it can be argued that the solutions provided by PSO are more reliable compared to 
solutions provided by GA. Thus, we have used the solutions provided by the proposed PSO in the rest of 
paper. 
 As mentioned previously, this paper aims to compare the behavior of PPs in collusion and 
competitive markets and in the presence of external costs. Fig. (5) illustrates the generated electricity by 
PPs with respect to both markets and various scenarios of external costs. Due to being equipped with more 
efficient equipment, the second PP has generated more electricity than first and third ones in both markets 
and different scenarios (near to its maximum capacity). According to Fig. (5), amount of electricity 
generated by the second PP does not differ in both markets significantly. It indicates that efficiency of 
equipment would decrease the sensitivity of PPs to the type of markets and external costs. The first PP has 
generated more electricity in the collusion market. On the other hand, the third PP has generated more 
electricity in the competitive market. In addition, it shows that amount of electricity generated by the first 
and third PPs have slightly increased and decreased by the increment of external costs, respectively. This 
is because of the fact that the equipment of the first PP is more efficient than the third PP. It should be noted 
that PPs and markets have been indicated in Fig. (5) using some abbreviations. For instance, ‘PCL1’ and 
‘PCM1’ refer to the first PP in collusion and competitive markets, respectively. The same kind of 
abbreviations have also been used in the rest of paper. 
>>Please insert Fig. (4) about here>> 
>>Please insert Fig. (5) about here>> 
 As illustrated in Fig. (6), profit acquired by all of PPs have decreased by the increment in the 
external costs. As the same as the production level, the second PP acquired more profit than the first and 
third ones. Considering that the first PP had generated more electricity in the collusion market, therefore, it 
has acquired more profit in this market compared to the competitive market. The third PP had generated 
more electricity in the competitive market, therefore, it has acquired more profit in this market compared 
to the collusion market. Although the first PP has generated more electricity in the sixth scenario of the 
collusion market than the competitive one, the increment in the external costs has decreased the margin 
profit of the first PP. In other words, generating more electricity in the presence of the external costs would 
not provide the same amount of profit as PPs could acquire in the absence of the external costs. The same 
trend can be argued for the third PP.  
>>Please insert Fig. (6) about here>> 
 Fig. (7) shows the fuel resource consumption of PPs in both markets and in the presence of external 
costs. Based on Fig. (7), the consumption of gas has not differed by the increment in the external costs, and 
in both markets. This trend has occurred due to that fact that gas only emits a negligible amount of 
contaminants. On the other hand, the consumption of fuel-oil has decreased by the increment in the external 
costs, and in both markets. This trend has occurred due to that fact that fuel-oil emits a considerable amount 
of contaminants. Since production levels of all PPs are higher in the collusion market, and the available 
fuel resources of gas are limited, the second PP has used more gas-oil by the increment in the external costs. 
This trend has occurred because of the fact that equipment in this PP is more efficient compared to other 
PPs. Thus, this PP has consumed more gas-oil and less gas to let others use more gas. In this way, other 
PPs could use more gas, which is a greener fuel resource, in order to decrease the external costs. It should 
be noted that fuel resources, and markets have been indicated in Fig. (6) using some abbreviations. For 
instance, ‘FOCL’, ‘GOCL’, and ‘GCM’ refer to fuel-oil in the collusion market, gas-oil in the collusion 
market, and gas in the competitive market, respectively. Moreover, the consumption gas has been drawn 
based on the right axis, but the consumption of other fuel resources have been drawn based on the left axis. 
>>Please insert Fig. (7) about here>> 
Figs. (8) and (9) illustrate the emission of environmental pollutants, i.e., 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2, 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 in both 
markets and in the presence of external costs. According to Fig. (8), emission of 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 in both markets has 
gradually decreased by the increment in external costs. Considering the fact that fuel-oil is the main source 
for the emission of 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2, the decrement in the use of fuel-oil has decreased the emission of this contaminant. 
Likewise, the same trend has happened for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2. In the case of 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥, both fuel-oil and gas-oil are recognized 
as the main sources of this contaminant. Due to the fact that there is not a specific trend for the consumption 
of these fuel resources when the external costs increase, therefore, the consumption of 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 does not also 
pursue a specific trend over various scenarios. 
>>Please insert Fig. (8) about here>> 
>>Please insert Fig. (9) about here>> 
 Eventually, Table (10) compares the total profit acquired by all PPs in both markets and in the 
various scenarios. According to Table (10), the total profit acquired by all PPs is slightly more in the 
collusion market compared to the competitive market. Moreover, it is clear that increment in the external 
costs has decreased the total profit acquired by all PPs in both markets. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Profit share of PPs in the cases of collusion and competition (Billion USD) 
                           Scenarios 
Mode of 
cooperation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total profit in the 
collusion market 202.817 192.602 182.437 172.436 162.595 152.826 
Total profit in the 
competitive market 202.613 192.404 182.246 172.250 162.434 152.645 
Taking into account what has been discussed so far, it can be concluded that increment in the 
external costs would not significantly affect PPs that are equipped with efficient equipment in both markets. 
In other words, these PPs are not sensitive to the external costs. Therefore, the increment of the external 
costs could be a powerful incentive for PPs to equip themselves with more efficient equipment. In other 
words, governments can mitigate the environmental contaminants emitted by PPs in the presence of the 
external costs.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, two mathematical formulations were proposed to study the behavior of PPs in the collusion 
and competitive markets and in the presence of external costs. To solve this model, two meta-heuristic 
algorithms, i.e., GA and PSO algorithm, were also proposed. The parameters of GA was tuned using the 
RSM method. Moreover, the parameters of PSO algorithm were also tuned based on Clerc and Kennedy 
(2002). Then, the performance of these two algorithms was compared using 2 − 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡 test. The results 
showed that the proposed PSO outperforms the proposed GA in terms of mean value and standard deviation 
of solutions. For this reason, this algorithm was used in the rest of the paper. 
Afterward, a numerical example was created and introduced, which includes three different PPs 
regarding their equipment. These PPs have been evaluated in both collusion and competitive markets, and 
in the presence of the external costs. To determine how the presence of the external costs could affect the 
PPs, we defined six different scenarios for the external costs. Assessment of this numerical example showed 
that increment in the external costs affects PPs almost similarly in both markets. Whereas, PPs affect less 
in the collusion market compared to the competitive market. The computational results showed that 
increment in the external costs motivates PPs to use more gas-oil and less fuel-oil. Despite the lower cost 
of purchasing fuel-oil, PPs found it more efficient to use more gas-oil in the presence of the external costs. 
Increasing the external costs does not affect the consumption of gas in both markets due to its low 
contaminant emission rate. 
The computational results also showed that not only profit of PPs would decrease in the presence of the 
external costs, but also the emission of environmental contaminants might decrease. According to the 
computational results, it can be concluded that increment in the external costs would not significantly 
affect PPs that are equipped with efficient equipment in both markets. In other words, these PPs are not 
sensitive to the external costs. Therefore, the increment of the external costs could be a powerful incentive 
for PPs to equip themselves with more efficient equipment. In other words, governments can mitigate the 
environmental contaminants emitted by PPs in the presence of the external costs. 
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Fig. 1. Solution representation of the proposed algorithms 
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a) Crossover Operator
b) Mutation Operator
 
Fig. 2. The illustrative examples for the two-point crossover and swap mutation operators 
 
 
Fig. 3. Effectiveness of factors and their interactions on objective function (𝛼𝛼 = 0.1) 
 
 Fig. 4. Comparison of the results obtained by the proposed GA and PSO for the first scenario of external 
costs and in the collusion market 
 
 
Fig. 5. Amount of electricity generated by PPs in the collusion and competitive markets and in the 
presence of external costs 
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 Fig. 6. Profit acquired by PPs in the collusion and competitive markets and in the presence of external 
costs 
 
 
Fig. 7. The consumption of fuel resources by PPs in the collusion and competitive markets and in the 
presence of external costs 
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 Fig. 8. Emission of 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 and 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶2 by PPs in the collusion and competitive markets and in the presence of 
external costs 
 
 
Fig. 9. Emission of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 by PPs in the collusion and competitive markets and in the presence of external 
costs  
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